This was demonstrated in April 2013, when a force contingent of the People`s Liberation Army of China (PLA) penetrated deep into the Depsang Plateau, east of Von Ladakhs, a region of Jammu and Kashmir that shares a border with China. The troops pitched tents on Indian territory, violated previous confidence-building measures and pushed India into a diplomatic and military scam. This was signed in October 2013, but the topic is in the news in April 2014, because the army officers of both parties met under the provisions of this pact. Q.What are the main features of the agreement between India and China on the Defence Security Cooperation Agreement (BDCA)? How will this benefit the Indian side? (200 words) Beijing appears to be planning to keep the border dispute alive as a tactical pressure point against India. China seems to be waiting for a good moment for the current military asymmetry with India to spread and for Beijing to be able to carry out the dispute on its own terms. The BDCA issue has been thoroughly analysed and justifies the urgency for the Chinese to sign this agreement, but the good complexion of this proposal can only be assessed when it is published. Before Singh`s visit to China, I wrote a rather critical piece for The Diplomat, in which I argued that the way India resolved the crisis was strategically reckless. Other commentators argued that India`s strategy towards China was more nuanced than it could appear at first glance. In reality, the BDCA could do little to reduce the likelihood of a border dispute between India and China along the LoAC, but in the end, the agreement appears to be in India`s interest. It ensures that in the event of monstrous aggression, such as Daulat Beg Oldi, there are a number of bilaterally agreed rules to report the situation. Reading the text of the article from Article VI makes it clear that the BDCA is doing little to reduce the likelihood of misperception of The LoAC. Article VI expressly prohibits one party from actively tracking or following another party`s patrols, as was the case in April. Articles VI, VII and VIII explicitly describe dispute resolution procedures in “areas where there is no common understanding of the effective line of control.” This is intended to cast doubt on the usefulness of the 1993 agreement.